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A CRITIQUE OF INTEREST ON LAWYERS' TRUST
ACCOUNTS PROGRAMS
In the past five years, twenty American jurisdictions' have initiated
programs to permit or require lawyers to invest client funds for the benefit
of state bar associations or foundations.2 Such legal heavyweights as the
American Bar Association (ABA) Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility3 and the Conference of Chief Justices of the Fifty State
Courts" have promoted the adoption of the programs. Opposing bankers
and lawyers in only a few states have successfully contested adoption of
the programs.' Louisiana has not adopted such a program, but the Board
of Governors of the Louisiana State Bar Association has asked that a
committee be formed to study the programs." The issues concerning these
programs deserve serious and thoughtful analysis.
This comment will first review the current Louisiana status on use
of client funds and will then analyze three issues concerning the programs:
(1) Do the programs violate the Taking Clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution? (2) Do the programs violate
the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution? (3) Are the programs unethical?'
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. As of August 1983, the following jurisdictions, listed in order of adoption, had
initiated lawyers' trust accounts programs: Florida, California, Idaho, Maryland, Colorado,
New Hampshire, Minnesota, Oregon, Illinois, Nevada, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Michigan.
Rivlin, LO.L.T.A. Gains Momentum Nationwide, 69 A.B.A. J. 1036, 1038 (1983); see also
In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 156-57 (Minn. 1982). Since August 1983,
seven additional states have adopted programs. See At Issue: Has IOLTA 's Time Arrived?,
70 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1984, at 16.
2. In most cases, the funds are channeled through either the bar association (Califor-
nia) or a bar foundation (Florida). See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6212(c)(1) (West.
Supp. 1984); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). In one state,
however, the income is paid directly to the Legal Services Corporation. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (Supp. 1983). Because Florida's plan was the first one adopted in the
United States, its practice of sending the funds to the bar foundation is considered the
predominant practice throughout this comment. Although interest on lawyers' trust accounts
programs are commonly given the acronym, I.O.L.T.A., throughout this comment they will
be referred to as "the programs."
3. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982)
(placing clients' funds at interest) [hereinafter cited as ABA Formal Op. 348], reprinted
in Professional Ethics Opinions, 68 A.B.A. J. 1502-06 (1982).
4. See Berg, A Significant New Revenue Source for Legal Services Begins: Interest
on Trust Accounts, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1015, 1015 (1982).
5. Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia
have rejected the programs. Rivlin, supra note 1, at 1038.
6. Barham, IOL TA, A New and Painless Revenue Source for Legal Services, 31 LA.
B.J. 270, 273 (1984). For a brief essay on legal services for the indigent in Louisiana, see
Hogan & Duhon, Legal Services for the Poor, 28 LA. B.J. 129 (1980).
7. For discussion of the current Louisiana practice, see infra text accompanying notes
8-53; the Taking Clause issue, see infra text accompanying notes 77-117; the procedural
due process issue, see infra text accompanying notes 118-92; the ethics issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 193-220.
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Present Practice in Louisiana
The current practice of attorneys handling client funds is to place
the funds into non-interest-bearing checking accounts until the funds are
disbursed in accord with the client's wishes.' In some cases, when the
client so requests, the attorney places the funds into an individual interest-
bearing account,9 such as a relatively new NOW (negotiable order of
withdrawal) account.'" Interest paid on the individual client's funds is
remitted to the client or used for his benefit.''
In 1982, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility issued an opinion on several issues concerning client funds in
general.' 2 Although the opinion is merely advisory and is not binding on
Louisiana lawyers,' 3 it is persuasive authority on the duties of Louisiana
lawyers concerning client funds.
The Committee first addressed the question of whether the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility" allows lawyers to place client funds
in interest-bearing accounts. The Committee concluded that nothing in
the Model Code prohibits the lawyer from putting client funds into interest-
bearing accounts,'" so long as the lawyer complies with disciplinary rule
9-102. Disciplinary rule 9-102 requires a Louisiana lawyer to: (1) deposit
8. Telephone interview with Tom Collins, Executive Counsel to the Louisiana State
Bar Association (July 27, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Telephone interview with Tom Collins].
9. When the lawyer places funds into interest-bearing accounts for the benefit of his
clients, potential conflicts of interest arise. For example, it is possible that a lawyer would
negotiate with his bank to offer the lawyer an inducement for depositing his client trust
funds in that bank. The lawyer might bargain for a lower rate of interest on a personal
or business loan from the bank, in exchange for the bank's agreement to pay a lower rate
of interest on the trust account. Such a transaction would violate the proscription of a
lawyer having a personal interest in conflict with his client's interest. See LA. CODE OF
PROF. REsp. DR 5-104(A) (found in ARTICLES OF INCORP., LA. STATE BAR Ass'N art. XVI;
La. R.S. tit. 37, ch. 4, app. (1974)) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROF. REsP.]. Or, if
the lawyer represents the bank, he might agree to open his trust account at a lower rate
of interest in order to get a larger share of the bank's legal business. That agreement would
violate disciplinary rule 5-104(A).
10. Use of this account may violate federal law. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32.
11. Telephone interview with Tom Collins, supra note 8.
12. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3.
13. The Louisiana Supreme Court has the final authority on disciplinary matters con-
cerning Louisiana lawyers. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
14. The Committee based its opinion on the Model Code, which is substantially the
same as Louisiana's Code of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1979), reprinted in 1 NAT'L REPORTER ON LEOAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 1-56 (1982). In August 1983, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, reprinted in 69 A.B.A. J. 1671 (1983), replacing
the old Model Code in its entirety. Because the ABA opinion was based on the old Model
Code and because Louisiana's Code of Professional Responsibility is an adaptation of the
old Model Code, references to the newly adopted Model Rules will not be made unless
pertinent.
15. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 2.
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client funds (other than costs and expense advances) into a bank account, 6
(2) avoid commingling client funds with his own funds,' 7 (3) notify the
client of the receipt of funds,' (4) maintain records of client funds,' 9
(5) render an accounting to the client regarding his funds,"0 and (6) deliver
a client's funds to him on demand.2'
The Committee's opinion indicates that a lawyer could invest client
funds in interest-bearing accounts, but not in all kinds of interest-bearing
accounts. Investment of client funds in passbook savings accounts prob-
ably would not violate disciplinary rule 9-102 because the funds could
be withdrawn at any time to repay the client if the client so requested.22
Unless the client consents, a Louisiana lawyer could not invest client funds
in time deposits, such as certificates of deposit, because those accounts
are not payable on demand of the client.23 Nor could he invest client
16. All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts
maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging
to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to
the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to
the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer
or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed
portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
CODE OF PROF. REsp. DR 9-102(A) (1974), supra note 9.
17. Legitimate commingling of a client's funds with other clients' funds can also be
a problem. When a lawyer deposits all his clients' trust funds into one trust account and
is inattentive to the balance of an individual client, he may negligently overdraw the balance
of one client. Such an overdrawal constitutes a conversion of another client's funds to benefit
the first client. The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to excuse this improper handling
of a trust account. In re Fling, 316 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 1982).
18. "A lawyer shall: (1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities,
or other properties." CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 9-102(B)(l) (1974), supra note 9.
19. "A lawyer shall: . . . (3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and
other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate
accounts to his client regarding them." Id. DR 9-102(B)(3).
20. For one way to organize a system to account for client funds, see Kurzer, Cole-
man, Leiter & Trager, Attorneys' Trust Accounts-Rules and Pitfalls, 55 FLA. B.J. 355
(1981).
21. "A lawyer shall: . . . (4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by
a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the
client is entitled to receive." CODE OF PROF. RaSP. DR 9-102(B)(4) (1974), supra note 9.
22. But if the lawyer's contract with the bank on the passbook savings account provid-
ed that the bank did not have to pay on demand, use of the accounts would violate disciplinary
rule 9-102.
23. If funds are not payable on demand of the client, then the attorney has committed
at least a technical violation of disciplinary rule 9-102. Violations of this disciplinary rule
are already a serious problem, judging from the number of recent cases involving these
infractions. See LSBA v. Mitchell, 375 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1979); LSBA v. Jordan, 375 So.
2d 89 (La. 1979); LSBA v. Rivette, 368 So. 2d 1045 (La. 1979); LSBA v. Phillips, 363
So. 2d 667 (La. 1978); LSBA v. Jacques, 260 La. 803, 257 So. 2d 413, cert. denied, 409
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funds in any non-bank investment account, such as brokerage accounts
or mutual funds, since disciplinary rule 9-102(A) requires the client's funds
to be deposited in a bank."'
Whether Louisiana lawyers can use NOW (negotiable order of
withdrawal) accounts depends on whether the funds are eligible for deposit
in a NOW account. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 198025 places strict limitations on who can use
a NOW account and on what kind of funds can be deposited in a NOW
account. The depositor must be either an individual, a fiduciary, an agent,
a nonprofit organization, or a governmental unit.26 Corporations, part-
nerships, associations, business trusts, or other organizations are express-
ly prohibited from using a NOW account unless they qualify as an agent
or fiduciary. 7
Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve Board provides that depositors
who are fiduciaries of trust accounts may use NOW accounts if the
beneficiaries of the funds on deposit in the trust account are exclusively
individuals.2 ' The same provision applies to agents holding escrow funds
under agency agreements. 9
The conclusion to be drawn from the federal act and the regulations
is that a Louisiana lawyer could use NOW accounts as client trust accounts
in only two situations. First, a solo practitioner who is unincorporated
could use a NOW account for his clients' funds because he is an
individual.3" Second, a lawyer or law firm conducting practice as a part-
nership or professional corporation could, as the clients' agent or fiduciary,
use a NOW account for clients' funds, but only when no entity other
U.S. 877 (1972); LSBA v. Klein, 253 La. 603, 218 So. 2d 610 (1969); LSBA v. Hay.on,
250 La. 651, 198 So. 2d 391 (1967); LSBA v. Mayeaux, 249 La. 7, 184 So. 2d 537 (1966);
LSBA v. Powell, 248 La. 237, 178 So. 2d 235 (1965); LSBA v. Yoder, 243 La. 909, 148
So. 2d 597 (1963); LSBA v. Woods, 243 La. 94, 141 So. 2d 828 (1962).
24. Whether "bank" excludes savings and loans or credit unions is uncertain. Arguably,
the requirement for depositing client funds in a bank is due to concern for the safety of
the client's funds. Since savings and loan associations and credit unions are subject to federal
and state laws regulating the protection of depositors' funds, such institutions should qualify
as "banks" for purposes of disciplinary rule 9-102(A).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982); Eligibility for NOW Accounts, 12 C.F.R. § 217.157
(1983); see also 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1982); Eligibility for NOW Accounts, 12 C.F.R. § 329.103
(1983).
27. See Eligibility for NOW Accounts, 12 C.F.R. § 217.157 (1983).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The regulation permits an individual to use a NOW account for any purposes,
whether personal or business. But the lawyer could not commingle client funds with other
funds in a NOW account any more than he could in any other kind of account. See CODE
OF PROF. REsp. DR 9-102(A) (1974), supra note 9.
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than an individual will have a beneficial interest in the funds." Thus the
lawyer may have to refrain from using a NOW account if his client is
not an individual or if anyone else who is not an individual has or might
acquire a beneficial interest in the deposited funds.
The lawyer practicing in a partnership or professional corporation may
wish to avoid the use of a NOW account for client funds because of
the potential problem of depositing ineligible funds into such accounts.32
The ABA Committee also addressed the question of whether a lawyer
is ever under a duty to place client funds in an interest-bearing account.
Since the Model Code requires only that the lawyer safeguard a client's
property, the Committee concluded that the law of agency and trusts
governs this issue,33 and that law does not require a fiduciary to invest
funds if circumstances show that his only duty under the agreement with
the client was to safeguard the funds."' The Committee stated that in
most instances the lawyer's only duty is to safeguard and not to invest."
Therefore, the Committee concluded, the lawyer is not under a duty to
place client funds in an interest-bearing account.3 6 The Committee noted
one exception, however: When the funds are to be held for a long period
and the amount of money is substantial, so that the income earned would
exceed the costs of administering the account, the lawyer should consult
with the client and follow the client's wishes concerning investing. 7 An
"extreme violation" of this duty to consult would be grounds for
disciplinary action. 3
Nothing in the Louisiana jurisprudence or the Louisiana State Bar
Association opinions indicates that a failure to invest a client's funds to
earn a profit for the client would violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility.39 It is reasonable to conclude, however, that the Louisiana
Supreme Court, like the ABA Committee, would consider the amount
of money and the length of the holding period in determining whether
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982); Eligibility for NOW Accounts, 12 C.F.R. § 217.157
(1983).
32. To avoid this problem in the Florida program, the proponents obtained a special
ruling from the Federal Reserve System to permit Florida lawyers to use NOW accounts.
See ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 6.





38. Id. at 3-4. The basis for such disciplinary action is "DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect); DR
6-101 (A)(1) (competence); and DR 7-101(A)(1) (zealous representation)." Id. at 4.
39. Of course, if the attorney and the client agreed that the attorney would invest the
funds for the client's profit, and the attorney failed to do so, a lawyer would have violated
disciplinary rule 6-101(A)(3) which reads: "a lawyer shall not . . . neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him."
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a lawyer acted in the best interests of his client, if he failed to consult
the client about investing a large sum of money to be held for a lengthy
period.
The ABA Committee also addressed the question of what are a
lawyer's duties to the client when the client's funds are invested in an
interest-bearing account. The Committee concluded that the lawyer in such
a case must comply with the requirements of disciplinary rule 9-102(B)(1),
(3), and (4)40 because interest posted to the client's account becomes the
client's funds. Those rules require that the lawyer give notice to the client
when the interest on the account is earned," maintain records of the in-
come earned,' 2 render an accounting of the earned income to the client,' 3
and promptly pay the income to the client when the client requests the
funds." These rules should apply to Louisiana lawyers since, under Loui-
siana law, the income belongs to the client.' The lawyer is under a duty
to treat that income as he would any other property of the client.
The ABA committee additionally addressed the issue of whether the
lawyer could retain the interest earned on a client's account if his ad-
ministrative costs exceeded the income earned. The Committee concluded
that the lawyer's retention of the interest would violate disciplinary rule
5-104's prohibition' of "conflicts between the financial interest of the
lawyer and those of the client."' 7
40. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 4.
41. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(B)(1) (1979).
42. Id. DR 9-102(B)(3).
43. Id.
44. Id. DR 9-102(B)(4).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 64-76.
46. Disciplinary rule 5-104(A) states: "A lawyer shall not enter into a business trans-
action with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer
to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the
client has consented after full disclosure."
47. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 5-6. This conclusion was based on two
earlier opinions rendered by the Committee and on Canon 11 of the former Canons of
Professional Ethics. Id. Former Canon 11 stated:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit
or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly,
and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used
by him.
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 47 (ABA 1967).
This canon had formed the basis for ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal
Decision 545 (1962) and Informal Op. 991 (1967). ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3,
at 5-6. In Informal Decision 545, the Committee on Professional Ethics stated that a lawyer
who earned interest on commingled client's funds could not keep the interest, even if it
was " 'quite difficult to allocate' the interest to particular clients." ABA Formal Op. 348,
supra note 3, at 5 (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Decision 545
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This last issue apparently has not arisen in Louisiana, but an analogy
can be made to cases where the attorney has kept interest on judgments
collected for his clients. In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Mitchell,"
a plaintiff's attorney received from the defendant's attorney a check
representing interest, costs, and attorney fees due the plaintiff on a judg-
ment. The plaintiff's attorney used the interest for his own benefit in-
stead of paying it to his client. 9 Charged with violating disciplinary rule
9-102, the attorney defended his conduct on the ground that, since his
expenses had exceeded the amount of interest collected on the judgment,
he had not converted the client's funds.5" The Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected this argument and publicly reprimanded the attorney."'
Likewise, if the attorney keeps interest earned on an investment of
a client's funds, where administative costs do not exceed the income
earned, he has converted the client's property and violated disciplinary
rules 5-10452 and 9-102.11
Background: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts Programs
An interest on lawyers' trust accounts program is a plan14 whereby
(1962), reprinted in I INFORmAL ETHICS OPINIONS 544 (ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof.
Resp. 1975)). In Informal Opinion 991, reprinted in 2 INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 867 (ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp. 1975), the Committee decided that a lawyer could not
use interest earned on a client fund account to offset the costs of operating the account.
ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 5.
48. 375 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1979).
49. Id. at 1351.
50. Id. at 1353.
51. Id. at 1354. The court said it imposed the light penalty partially because the lawyer
had committed a mere "technical violation." Id. The usual penalty for conversion of a
client's funds, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, is disbarment. See LSBA v. Jordan,
375 So. 2d 89 (La. 1979); LSBA v. Phillips, 363 So. 2d 667 (La. 1978); LSBA v. Jacques,
260 La. 803, 257 So. 2d 413, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972); LSBA v. Klein, 253 La.
603, 218 So. 2d 610 (1969); LSBA v. Haylon, 250 La. 651, 198 So. 2d 391 (1967); LSBA
v. Yoder, 243 La. 909, 148 So. 2d 597 (1963); LSBA v. Woods, 243 La. 94, 141 So. 2d
828 (1962).
52. See infra text accompanying note 201.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 195-98.
54. In some states, the plans have been adopted by statute. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (Supp. 1983).
In other states, the plans have been adopted by the state supreme courts under their authority
to legislate for and regulate the legal profession. See, e.g., In re Interest on Trust Accounts,
402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982);
In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982). If the Louisiana
Supreme Court were asked to adopt such a program under its authority to regulate the
legal profession within Louisiana, the court might face the question of whether its regulatory
power can be so extended under the Louisiana Constitution. "The powers of government
of the state are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial."
LA. CONST. art. 11, § 1. "Except as otherwise provided by this constitutuion, no one of
these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belong-
ing to either of the others." Id. art. II, § 2. See infra note 210.
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lawyers" deposit client funds into interest-bearing trust accounts in finan-
cial institutions. The financial institutions channel the interest earned on
the client funds to state bar foundations to pay for special law-related
projects considered to be in the public interest. The plans vary somewhat
from state to state, but generally work in the following fashion.
The plan affects only those 'client funds that are to be held for a
short period or that are so small that it is not practical to place them
into a separate interest-bearing account for the individual client.5 6 When
a lawyer receives funds that meet one of the two criteria, he places the
funds into a special trust account in a bank or savings and loan
55. The lawyer, not the client, decides whether to participate in the program. In a
number of states, the client has absolutely no voice in deciding whether his funds are to
be used to generate income for the bar foundation. In Florida, for example, the Florida
Supreme Court has ruled that the lawyer need not even give the client any notice that his
funds may be used to earn interest that will be paid to the bar foundation. In re Interest
on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). In accord are the Minnesota and New Hamp-
shire Supreme Courts. See In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982);
In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982). The California
and Maryland statutes adopting these plans do not require that the client have any choice
in whether his funds are used to generate income for the bar foundation. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (Supp. 1983).
Contrary to these states' decisions and statutes, the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to
adopt a program that did not require notice to the client. In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 279 Ark. 84, 648 S.W.2d 480 (1983). For a more detailed discussion of the con-
stitutional issue of whether absence of notice to the client in these plans violates procedural
due process, see infra text accompanying notes 118-92.
56. If the amount of the funds is large enough to earn an amount of interest that
will cover the charges of maintaining the account and accounting for the interest earned
for the individual client, then a separate account is established for the individual client and
the interest earned on that account is paid to the client. The same is true if the funds
are small in amount but will be held for a period of time long enough to earn interest
sufficient to cover the costs of the account. In general, the lawyer is charged with determin-
ing whether the income from the funds advanced by the client will be sufficient to cover
the charges. The Maryland statute provides a guideline for the lawyer to use in determining
whether to place the funds in an individual account for the benefit of the client or into
a pooled account for the benefit of the bar association or its foundation.
If in the judgment of the attorney any trust moneys received from any client
or beneficial owner are too small in amount or are reasonably expected to be
held for too short a period of time to generate at least $50 of interest or such
larger amount of interest as in the judgment of the attorney may be equivalent
to the cost of administering an account for the benefit of the client or beneficial
owner, such moneys may be pooled and commingled by the attorney with other
such moneys held for other clients or beneficial owners, and the aggregate in-
terest earned on such commingled account shall be paid at least quarterly, net
of any service charges, by the depository bank or savings and loan association,
to the Maryland Legal Services Corporation exclusively for the charitable pur-
poses defined in its statutory charter.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (Supp. 1983). But other states have furnished no guidelines
to the attorney deciding whether the amount of money is small enough or the period short
enough to qualify the funds for the programs. Therefore, the lawyer is left to his own
1006 [Vol. 44
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association." Each lawyer maintains one special trust account for all funds
that meet the criteria above, whether the funds are advanced by one of
his clients or by several of his clients. The interest earned on the pooled
funds is paid to the state bar foundation,58 which uses the interest to
finance public interest programs, generally including legal services for the
poor and other activities considered to be of benefit to society as a whole."
The rationale behind the plan is that when the sums advanced are
small or when they are to be held for only a short time, placing the funds
into interest bearing accounts for the benefit of the individual client is
impractical because the cost of accounting for the income to each client
discretion to decide whether the sum is small enough or the period short enough to qualify
the funds for participation in the program. For a discussion on the possible problems that
could arise from this absence of a standard, see infra text accompanying notes 185-89.
57. Generally, the plan works on a voluntary basis, i.e., each lawyer or firm chooses
whether to participate in the program. Florida, Maryland, and New Hampshire, for exam-
ple, all have voluntary programs. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (Supp. 1983); In re New Hampshire Bar
Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982). But, in at least two states, the program is
mandatory; every lawyer who receives from a client funds that qualify for the program
must deposit the funds into pooled accounts from which the income is paid to the bar
foundation. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211 (West Supp. 1984); In re Minnesota State
Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982). The purpose of making the Minnesota program
mandatory, said the Minnesota Supreme Court, was to maximize the income to the bar
foundation and to avoid the difficulties that Florida had experienced in urging lawyers to
participate voluntarily. Id. at 1.58. Florida has experienced some trouble in convincing lawyers
to join the program, and currently, 85% of the lawyers do not participate in its program.
Rivlin, supra note 1, at 1037-38 . For an example of the appeals from the Florida Bar
Association to lawyers in Florida to increase their participation, see Smith, Something for
Nothing, 55 FLA. B.J. 692 (1981).
58. As a general rule, the moneys earned on the accounts are paid to bar foundations
that are exempt from federal income tax. See, e.g., In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356
So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258
(1982). However, other entities have also been established as the recipient of the funds that
will be used for law-related projects. In California, the state bar itself is the recipient. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6212 (West Supp. 1984). In Maryland, the recipient is the Maryland
Legal Services Corporation. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (Supp. 1983). In Minnesota,
the state supreme court established a board of lawyers to administer the funds received
from the program. In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982). For
simplicity's sake, all references in this paper to recipients who are tax-exempt will be termed
the "bar foundation."
59. Some of the other activities funded by income generated from the trust accounts
are loans and scholarships for law students and other programs to "improve the administration
of justice." See, e.g., In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 811 (Fla. 1978).
California has provided strict guidelines for determining what programs qualify to receive
grants to provide legal services for the indigent and specifies what guidelines are to be used
to allocate the funds geographically. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6213, 6214, 6216 (West
Supp. 1984). Some activities that were proposed for funding through the interest on trust
accounts have had to be dropped because the activity did not meet the Internal Revenue
Service's requirements for preserving the tax exempt status of the bar foundation. In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
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is thought to exceed the amount of interest that an individual client would
earn."0 In the absence of the plan, these funds are deposited into non-
interest-bearing accounts in order to avoid incurring the accounting costs;
thus, the financial institution where the funds are deposited has free use
of the money. Proponents of the plan claim that a policy allowing the
funds to earn interest that can be used to benefit the public is better than
allowing the banks to use the funds without charge.'
Pooling client funds in these programs generates a substantial amount
of interest over a one-year period. In Canada, for example, a plan such
as this earns over $34 million annually for the bar association. 2 Such
a substantial source of revenue cannot be ignored when demands on the
state coffers are increasing. On the other hand, a state should not adopt
such a program without examining some serious legal questions.' 3
60. Gonser, Almond, F. Ziegler, Financing Public Services Activities With Interest-Bearing
Attorney Trust Accounts, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 219, 220 (1979); Rivlin, supra note 1, at 1037;
Comment, A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part II: A Recom-
mendation for the Use of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust
Accounts to Support Programs of the Texas Bar Association and an Analysis of the Federal
Income Tax Ramifications, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 113 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, A Source of Revenue, Part I1]; Comment, A Source of Revenue for the Improve-
ment of Legal Services, Part : An Analysis of the Plans in Foreign Countries and Florida
Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts
to Support Programs of the Organized Bar, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 539, 539 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, A Source of Revenue, Part I]; Note, Interest on Attorney Trust Ac-
counts: A Questionable Approach in Florida, 8 STETSON L. REV. 413, 421 (1979).
61. Rivlin, supra note 1, at 1036. The accounting cost rationale is subject to some
criticism. Even simple desktop computers are capable of allocating the income earned among
clients. Indeed, some financial institutions now furnish such services to customers. ABA
Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 3. Thus the actual computing of the income may not
cost more than the income that is generated. What may cause the costs of accounting to
exceed the amount of income earned on an individual client's balance in a trust account
is the additional cost of accounting to the Internal Revenue Service for the amount of in-
terest paid to each client. Federal tax laws require the lawyer to file an information return
with the Internal Revenue Service for each client to whom the lawyer made a payment
of interest of $10 or more in a one-year period. See I.R.C. § 6049(a) (1976). Thus, there
exists the possibility of the curious situation in which it would be cost-effective to pay in-
terest to a client if the sum was under $10, and yet not cost-effective to pay the client
interest of a sum exceeding $10.
62. Rivlin, supra note 1, at 1037.
[Bly the end of May, 1983, with only a 15 per cent participation rate among
the state's lawyers, the Florida Bar Foundation has raised $1.3 million after 19
months. . . . An A.B.A. task force on I.O.L.T.A. estimated that $100 million
might be raised in one year if every penny of the $1.8 billion deposited in
noninterest-bearing accounts by all attorneys were deposited at 5.25 per cent interest.
Id.
63. One of those legal issues has been resolved. For federal income tax purposes, the
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the income generated by the trust account programs
is not taxable to either the client or the lawyer. Rev. Rul. 209, 1981-2 C.B. 16; cf. General
Counsel Memorandum No. 38,374 (May 12, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedtax library, Gen. Counsel
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Income as Client's Property Under Louisiana Law
The resolution of each issue concerning the programs depends in part
on whether state law considers the interest income as the client's prop-
erty. Only property is protected by the fourteenth amendment, and only
the client's property is protected by Louisiana's Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, in analyzing whether Louisiana should adopt such
a program, a threshhold question is whether the client has a property
right under Louisiana law. An examination of Louisiana law leads to the
conclusion that the client does.
Louisiana Civil Code article 551 specifies that interest is a civil fruit:
"Civil fruits are revenues derived from a thing by operation of law or
by reason of a juridical act, such as . . . interest .... -6' As a civil
fruit, interest is the property of the owner of the principal."
Proponents of the program might concede that the income itself is
property, but they argue that the client has no right to the income because
the "program creates income where none existed before." ' 66 In other words,
the client has only an inchoate right to the income. 67 The fallacy in this
argument is the failure to recognize that the client's inchoate right to the
income is also property. The jurisprudence defines property as "the total
mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a person
for the satisfaction of his economic needs."
66
In State v. Hagerty,69 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that
an inchoate right to income is property. In Hagerty, the public ad-
ministrator of Orleans Parish was convicted of theft of interest earned
for the state. In violation of his fiduciary duty to collect and hold for
the state certain unclaimed property, the administrator had invested the
funds and retained the interest earned. The court rejected his defense that,
since the state did not own the funds,70 it could not own the income earned
Memo. file); see also id. No. 38,854 (May 18, 1982); Private Ruling No. 8,330,104 (Apr.
18, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedtax library, Priv. Ruling file); id. No. 8,316,108 (Jan. 19, 1983);
id. No. 8,314,065 (Jan. 6, 1983).
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 551.
65. LA. CIv. CODE art. 483.
66. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 4, at 1017.
67. Civiletti & Machen, At Issue: The Case for IOLTA, 70 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1984, at
16, 18.
68. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 165 (La. 1977) (emphasis added) (citing A. YIAN-
NOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 125 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 319 (2d ed. 1980)). In
addition to the Civil Code's provisions, other statutes support the conclusion that the in-
come earned on the trust account is "property." For example, a state banking law implies
that banks must pay interest on interest-bearing accounts to someone. See La. R.S. 6:11
(Supp. 1984). That statute creates a right to receive income earned on an interest-bearing
account. That right is "property" within the meaning of Civil Code article 483.
69. 251 La. 477, 205 So. 2d 369 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
70. The state did not own the funds because it was possible that the owners or their
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on the funds. The court found that the state's inchoate right to the funds
gave the state an inchoate right to the income and that the inchoate right
to the income was superior to any claim to the income which was not
based on title to the funds."
Implicit in Hagerty is the recognition that an inchoate right to either
the funds or the income is property. The case was decided on the basis
of property articles in the civil code," a basis which would be inappropriate
if the court did not consider the inchoate rights to be property.
In the program, the client has title to the funds, which gives rise to
an inchoate title to the interest earned on the funds." Under Hagerty,
that inchoate right to the interest earned is a property right.
heirs would claim the property and because title to the funds had never been transferred
to the state.
71. The court reasoned:
The State's title to the funds in defendant's possession at the time the instant
interest accrued was inchoate; that is, partial, temporary unfinished, provisional,
begun but not completed. . . . The State's title could have been taken away by
the appearance of the previously unknown owners or heirs, but until they made
their appearance the State had inchoate rights. As admitted by the defendant,
• . . he did not own the funds. Under the circumstances herein, the State's in-
choate title gave it an indicia of ownership.
251 La. at 494-95, 205 So. 2d at 375 (citations omitted).
72. The court applied the predecessors of Civil Code articles 483 and 551 to find that
the state owned the interest by accession. 251 La. at 494-95; 205 So. 2d at 375.
73. LA. CIV. CODE ART. 483. It reads: "In the absence of rights of other persons,
the owner of a thing acquires the ownership of its natural and civil fruits." Since the client
owns the funds, he also acquires the ownership of the interest earned on the funds-unless
article 483's qualifying phrase, "[i]n the absence of rights of other persons," applies. Com-
ment (c) to article 483 states:
The phrase "in the absence of rights of other persons" has been inserted to
indicate that accession does not supersede rights of other persons. For example,
despite the principle of accession, the fruits of a thing may belong to a usufruc-
tuary, a possessor in good faith, or even a lessee.
This comment could be the basis for the argument that article 483 allows subsequent legislation
to create exceptions to the general rule of accession. Thus, proponents could argue, the
adoption of a program would merely be an exception to accession. Since a program would
be a later expression of legislative will, LA. Crv. CODE art. 23, the program legislation would
override article 483.
This argument can be rebutted by pointing out that in Hagerty the court noted that "rights
of other persons" were not involved since the defendant had no title to the funds themselves.
251 La. at 494-95, 205 So. 2d at 375. Here, the bar foundation has no claim of title to
the client's funds. The holding in Hagerty can be rationalized with the examples in com-
ment (c) to article 483. The client in the program is in a different position than a naked
owner because a naked owner either consents to give up his revenues when he creates a
conventional usufruct, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 544-545, or knowingly accepts the naked owner-
ship subject to a testamentary or legal usufruct. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 544 & 890. But
the client neither consents, see infra text accompanying note 120, nor acquires his funds
initially on the condition that income will be paid to a third party. The same distinction
exists between a lessor and the client. The lease is consensual, see LA. COv. CODE art. 2669,
whereas the program is not.
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The client's inchoate right to income is protected by the Louisiana
Constitution. Article I, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
provides in part: "Every person has the right to acquire, own, control,
use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject
to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police
power.""' Since, in the opinions of the drafters of the Louisiana Con-
stitution, federal courts construing the United States Constitution had not
given adequate protection to property rights," the drafters intended the
meaning of property to be broadly construed.'
6
The Louisiana constitutional protection of property affects the pro-
grams because it establishes that one who owns property has a right to
control it and use it for his own purposes.
Violation of the United States Constitution's Taking Clause
The most serious constitutional question that has arisen" concerning
these programs is whether they violate the Taking Clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The fifth amendment,
through the fourteenth amendment, prohibits states from taking private
property without just compensation.' 8 Proponents of the programs argue
Furthermore, Amiss v. State, 340 So. 2d 1085 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), rejects the idea
that a third party can keep or dispose of interest earned on funds entrusted to him in
a fiduciary capacity, in the absence of express statutory authority that overrides the general
principle of article 483. In Amiss, the sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish had been holding
revenue sharing funds claimed by the state, the parish, and other public entities. When
a trial court ordered him to turn over the funds to the claimants, the sheriff refused to
turn over the interest earned on the funds in his possession. The first circuit rejected the
sheriff's arguments that certain statutes, LA. R.S. 6:748 (as it appeared prior to its amend-
ment by 1983 La. Acts, No. 675, § 1); LA. R.S. 39:1271 (as it appeared prior to its amend-
ment by 1982 La. Acts, No. 371, § 2), permitted him to retain the income, on the basis
that the statutes were not applicable. The court cited the predecessors to current articles
483 and 551 as controlling the disposition of this dispute. 340 So. 2d at 1088.
Thus, a third person holding funds for an owner is not entitled to keep the interest
earned on the funds because the owner of the funds owns the income. If the third person
cannot keep the income, neither can he give it away, as the program would require.
74. See Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of The Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV.
1, 10-13 (1975); Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REv. 9, 24 (1975).
75. State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So. 2d 479 (La. 1977); Jenkins, supra note
74, at 19-20.
76. Jenkins, supra note 74, at 19-20.
77. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 4; Berg & Johnson, A Proposed New Revenue Source
for Legal Services in Texas, 46 TEX. B.J. 57 (1983); Rivlin, supra note 1.
78. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states that "private prop-
erty [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." The fifth amendment
has been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City
of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (lth Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d
1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
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that no "property" is taken because the program takes only income that
it creates, and that the client has no property interest in the income.79
Opponents charge that the state takes income from the client without
compensation. State courts have decided the issue in favor of the pro-
ponents, primarily on the ground that the client had no property right
in the income under state law," but, in Louisiana, the courts should reach
the conclusion that the programs do violate the Taking Clause.
The "Property" Right at Stake
A violation of the Taking Clause occurs when two requirements are
satisfied: First, the right must be "property" within the meaning of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, and second, the government must have
"taken" the property right.
Since the inchoate right to income is "property" under Louisiana
law,82 it meets the first requirement for a violation of the Taking Clause
if it falls within the federal definition of property: "[T]he group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to
possess, use, and dispose of it. . . . The constitutional provision is ad-
dressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess. '"83
Thus, the client's right to use the funds meets the federal definition
of property. Since his right to use the property includes his right to con-
trol others' use, the client's right to control the attorney's use of the funds
also meets the federal definition.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right to control
the use of one's property as a property right protected by the fourteenth
79. See Civiletti & Machen, supra note 67, at 18.
80. See Marsh, At Issue: IOLTA Should be Rejected, 70 A.B.A. J. Jan. 1984, at 16, 16.
81. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); see also In re Min-
nesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n,
122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982). The Florida Supreme Court found that the inbome
was not a property interest of the client for two reasons: (1) the property was created where
it did not exist before, and (2) the client would never benefit from the income anyway.
402 So. 2d at 395. The first of those reasons was rejected in the similar case of Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), which the Florida Supreme Court
attempted to distinguish. 402 So. 2d at 395-96; see infra note 94. The second reason is
also debatable. Clients could be paid the interest earned if technological costs were reduced,
and it is also possible that the grants made by the bar foundation might benefit the client
in some cases.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 64-76.
83. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (emphasis added).
For a recent and scholarly discussion of what constitutes "property," see Alexander, The
Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn
in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1545 (1982). See also Terrell, "Property," "Due




amendment." In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,85 high school
students were evicted from a shopping center for distributing pamphlets
and soliciting petitions for a cause of which the shopping center owner
disapproved. When the California Supreme Court upheld a judgment
against the shopping center owner for violation of the students' first
amendment rights, the owner appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
arguing that the California Supreme Court's ruling which permitted the
students to exercise their first amendment rights on his property violated
his own rights under the due process clause." He argued that the right
to exclude others from his property was a fundamental property right
which the state could not deny him without due process87 nor take from
him without just compensation.
Although the Supreme Court held that the state had not taken his
property right," it did agree that the owner of the shopping center had
a property right. The court acknowledged: "that one of the essential sticks
in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others."89 In a
footnote the court wrote:
The term "property" as used in the Taking Clause includes
the entire "group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership]."
. . . It is not used in the "vulgar and untechnical sense of the
physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights
recognized by law. [Instead, it] denote[s] the group of rights in-
hering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right
to possess, use and dispose of it. '"98
84. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982);
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979). The Court in Kaiser Aetna analyzed the property right this way:
[There are] a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property"-
expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and
pay for before it takes over the management of the [owner's] property. . . . [W]e
hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a fundamental element
of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government
cannot take without compensation.
Id. at 179-80 (footnote omitted). In Kaiser Aetna, the property right involved was the right
to exclude the public from a private marina. The Court held that the United States could
not take a navigational servitude on part of that property without paying the owner com-
pensation. Id. at 80.
85. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
86. Id. at 79-80.
87. Id. at 79-80, 82.
88. Id. at 83. The rationale for the conclusion that there had been no taking was that
the owner of the building was deemed to have opened his premises to the public. Id.
89. Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
90. Id. at 82 n.6 (emphasis added; citation omitted) (quoting United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
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As the shopping center owner had a property right to deny others the
use of the shopping center, the clients have a right to deny the bar foun-
dation the use of their funds. And just as the students in Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center used "property" belonging to the shopping center owner,
the bar foundation uses "property" belonging to the clients.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies v. Beckwith9' authoritatively established this proposition. In Webb's
Fabulous Pharamacies (Webb's), Eckerd's had agreed to purchase Webb's
but discovered that Webb's might be insolvent. Eckerd's sued Webb's,
interpleaded all of Webb's creditors, and deposited the purchase price in-
to the court registry. A subsequently appointed receiver for Webb's
demanded the funds for Webb's creditors, plus interest earned while the
funds were in the registry. The clerk remitted the funds (less a substantial
fee allowed by statute),92 but refused to turn over the interest on the basis
of a state statute93 which provided that all interest earned on registry funds
belonged to the clerk of court.
The Florida Supreme Court held that because the creditors had no
property right, but merely an expectation, there was no violation of the
Taking Clause."' The United States Supreme Court reversed. Addressing
91. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
92. "The clerk of the circuit court shall make the following charges for services rendered
by his office in recording documents and instruments and in performing the duties enumerated.
• . . (13) For receiving money into the registry of court: (a) First $500.00, percent ...
2.00, (b) Each subsequent $100.00, percent . . . 1.00." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.24 (13) (West
1983).
93. The clerk of the circuit court in each county shall make an estimate of his pro-
jected financial needs for the county and shall invest any funds in designated
depositary banks in interest-bearing certificates or in any direct obligations of the
United States in compliance with federal laws relating to receipt of and withdrawal
of deposits .... [A]II interest accruing from moneys deposited shall be deemed
income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.33 (West Supp. 1983).
94. Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979). The bases
for the Florida court's decision to allow the clerk to keep the income were that the funds
became "public money" upon deposit into the registry, that the "statute takes only what
it creates," and that the interest earned was not private property. This rationale, which
the Supreme Court rejected in Webb's, is the same that the Florida court uses to justify
its approval of the program. See supra note 81. Less than a year after Webb's was decided,
the Florida Supreme Court held that the interest on lawyer's trust account programs did
not involve a "property" interest of the client, within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (1981). In this decision, the court
sought to distinguish Webb's on several grounds. First, it stated that the interest on lawyers'
trust account programs differed from Webb's because they create "income where there had
been none before." Id. at 395. That same argument had been made in Webb's, but did
not convince the United States Supreme Court. 449 U.S. at 164. The Supreme Court ap-
parently felt that the time of creation of the property was irrelevant to the question of
whether the property is protected by the United States Constitution. Id. Second, the Florida
Supreme Court tried to distinguish Webb's on the ground that the property interest in Webb's
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the issue of whether Webb's creditors had a property interest in the in-
come earned on the deposited funds or a mere expectancy which was not
a protected right, the Court stated:
Webb's creditors, however, had more than a unilateral expec-
tation. The deposited fund was the amount received as the pur-
chase price for Webb's assets. It was property held only for the
ultimate benefit of Webb's creditors, not for the benefit of the
court and not for the benefit of the county. . . . The creditors
thus had a state-created property right to their respective portions
of the fund.
• . . [They were also entitled to claim] a proper share of the
interest, the fruit of the fund's use .... 91
Application of the Webb's analysis to the programs clearly indicates
that the clients have a property interest protected by the Taking Clause.
First, the funds deposited by a client are private property, like the funds
deposited into the court in Webb's. Second, the client retains his owner-
ship of the funds deposited with the attorney. Third, the client has a claim
to the funds that is protected by state law and is a state-created right.
96
Fourth, the income earned on the lawyer's trust account is "the fruit of
the funds' use." Therefore, under a Webb's analysis, the client's inchoate
right to the income is a property interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment.
The Supreme Court decisions in Webb's and Pruneyard Shopping
Center thus indicate that the client does have a property interest in in-
come earned on deposited funds; therefore, the programs meet the first
criterion for a Taking Clause violation.
The Taking
In order for the programs to violate the Taking Clause, they must
was created by state law, whereas the client's interest in the income did not stem from
state law. 402 So. 2d at 395-396. This conclusion may be correct under Florida law, but
the court should have explained why the doctrine of accession does not apply to this case.
It appears from some preliminary research that the doctrine of accession would cause the
income to be considered the client's property. Florida has applied the doctrine in the past.
Mossier Acceptance Co. v. Norton Tire Co., 70 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1954); 1 FLA. JUR. 2D,
Accession, Confusion, and Improvements § 3 (1977). The third distinction that the Florida
Supreme Court made between Webb's and the program was that the programs were volun-
tary, whereas the statute in Webb's had been mandatory. 402 So. 2d at 396. Whether a
client chooses to participate voluntarily, however, depends on whether the lawyer informs
his client that funds on deposit with the lawyer may be used to generate income for the
bar foundation. Id. at 396. While the program does not prohibit lawyers from informing
their clients, it does not require the lawyer to inform the client. The choice is left entirely
up to the lawyer. Id. It can hardly be said that in all cases the client willingly gives the
lawyer or the bar foundation the right to use his funds to generate income for the foundation.
95. 449 U.S. at 161-62 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 64-81.
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meet the second criterion-the government must have "taken" property.
Not every deprivation of a property right is a taking in the constitutional
sense.97 The question of whether a taking exists in any set of facts is
basically a policy decision that results from balancing the weight of the
government's interest against the extent of the deprivation of an in-
dividual's interests. In other words, the question is whether it is fair to
place the burden of the loss on the individual or whether the government
should spread the burden of the loss among the members of society by
paying the individual for his loss.9" To aid in this policy decision, the
United States Supreme Court, choosing not to rely on one single test,
has devised a number of theories."
The Court has determined that the government's physical invasion
of an individual's property is a taking."' This deprivation is deemed serious
enough to outweigh the government's interests; therefore, the government
must pay compensation. The most recent application of the invasion
theory, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp., Io, supports the
conclusion that the extent of the deprivation of the client's right to the
income under the program outweighs the government's interest in pro-
viding revenue to fund legal services and law-related programs.
The Court in Loretto held that the government's permanent physical
occupation of the owner's property was a taking per se. "2 A New York
statute" 3 allowed cable companies to install wires and several small boxes
97. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). If the state
is exercising its right of eminent domain, the state must compensate the owner of the prop-
erty. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Fountain v. Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (1 1th Cir. 1982). If the state is-validly exercis-
ing its police power, it does not have to pay compensation. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974); Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383
(Ct. Cl. 1973). "Taking" has the same meaning under both the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d
1081 (6th Cir. 1978).
98. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1967); see also Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspec-
tive: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
99. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
100. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
101. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
102. Id. at 432. But, where the physical invasion does not go so far as to become a
permanent occupation, the Penn Central factors should be applied to determine whether
there is a taking. Id. at 440; see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978).
103. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 828(1) (McKinney 1982).
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upon landlords' property without the landlords' consent. In a suit by a
landlord against a cable company, the Loretto court found that the com-
pany had physically invaded the landlord's property by using space for
its wires and boxes, that the physical invasion amounted to a permanent
occupation of the space containing the wires and boxes, and that the per
se rule applied, even though only a very small amount of space was
taken. "o
This per se invasion theory should apply to the programs. First, the
programs require a physical invasion of the client's funds and his right
to the income from those funds. The invasion is physical because the
government takes possession of the property right to receive the income.
The money earned with the client's funds is not permitted to go into the
physical possession of the client. Instead, the government allows the in-
come to go into the physical possession of the bar foundation. The prop-
erty, which is in an intangible form, 0 is possessed and controlled solely
by the bar foundation and agents for the bar foundation and the
government.'" 6 The substance of the program is that the government
reaches into a private bank account and seizes for itself the income earned
on that account. Such possession and control constitute a physical
invasion,"' even if it affects only a small sum of money.
104. 458 U.S. at 425-26.
105. A physical invasion of an incorporeal occurs when the government possesses or
destroys the incorporeal. See Michelman, supra note 98, at 1184 & n.37.
106. The programs, in effect, order the financial institution to act as the government's
agent in paying the interest to the bar foundation.
107. Two cases imply that possession constitutes a physical invasion. In Loretto, the
Court stated: "So long as these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical
occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the
multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity." 458 U.S.
at 440. This passage must be considered in the context of the Loretto opinion which states
that physical invasions include both permanent occupations and temporary invasions that
are physical. Id. at 435-36. The passage states that one type of physical invasion (the per-
manent occupation) is to be analyzed under the Loretto rule. But the other type of physical
invasion (the temporary invasion) is to be analyzed under the tests used for nonpossessory
acts by the government. The Court is implying that physical invasions are in a different
category than nonpossessory acts. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Loretto
Court viewed possession as the rough equivalent of a physical invasion. This conclusion
follows because possession is clearly not a "nonpossessory" act. The division the Court
made was between "nonpossessory" and physical invasions. Therefore, if possession must
fall into one of those two classes, and if it cannot fall into the "nonpossessory" class,
then it must fall into the class of physical invasions.
The second case that lends support to this classification of possession as a physical inva-
sion is Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 91-96. In Webb's, the Court rejected the argument that the regula-
tion in question was merely a restriction on the use of the interpleaded fund. The Court
then characterized the government's action as an "exaction" and a "forced contribution
to general governmental revenues." Id. at 163. The language in Webb's is not framed in
terms of a physical invasion versus a nonpossessory activity, as is the language in Loretto.
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Furthermore, the physical invasion amounts to a permanent occupa-
tion of part of the property: the client's right to the income. The state,
through the program, not only occupies the income but removes any
possibility that the client may possess it'0 ' or use it in any way. Such
a deprivation is a permanent occupation of the client's income.', 9
The Loretto court found that where the government allows a third
party to occupy the property, the severity of the occupation was an even
greater justification for compensating the owner."' In the programs, the
invasion is made not by the government itself, but by the bar founda-
tion. Thus the taking of the client's income by a "stranger" burdens the
client with a "special kind of injury . . . [that] adds insult to injury.""'
Application of other theories such as the diminution of value theory," 2
Nevertheless, in both cases the Court is making the same distinction between physical inva-
sions and regulation through nonpossessory acts. In Webb's, the government took posses-
sion of the income earned on the interpleader fund, just as the government allows the bar
foundation to take possession of the income earned on the clients' funds under the pro-
grams under discussion. Clearly, in both cases the Court considers the act of taking posses-
sion and excluding the property owner as a physical invasion.
108. "[T]he permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any
power to control the use of property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make
no non-possessory use of the property." 458 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
109. The Court in Webb's found that the "forced contribution" of income earned on
the interpleader fund was a taking. Assuming that the Court was applying the invasion
theory there, it must have thought that the "forced contribution" was a permanent occupa-
tion of the income by the government. Thus, Webb's would stand for the proposition that
anytime the state takes income from funds deposited by a client, the state has made an
unlawful taking. That the amount of income taken is small does not mean it is "not of
constitutional significance." The size of the loss is irrelevant where there is a physical
occupation. 458 U.S. at 438 n.16.
110. The Court stated:
Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly
invades and occupies the owner's property .... [P]roperty law has long protected
an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession
of his property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise
complete dominion literally adds insult to injury. . . . Furthermore, such an
occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property,
even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner
may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.
Id. at 436.
111. Id.
112. The diminution of value theory has been applied in a large number of cases to
determine what is a "taking." See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (dicta); Maher
v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976);
Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 519 F. Supp. 1252 (D.N.J. 1981); Amchem Prod. v. Cos-
tie, 481 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Prendergast, 7
F.2d 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977). The
essence of this theory is that a taking occurs only when the value of all of the property
is substantially lowered as a result of the government's action. In other words, if the decrease
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the strand-bundle theory," 3 or the Penn Central factors,' may lead to
in value of the individual's property is slight, then the government's interest is deemed to
be greater than the individual's interest. Therefore, the government is not obligated to spread
the individual loss among members of society. The policy is that government is permitted
to extract small amounts of wealth from individuals and redistribute that wealth to others.
See Michelman, supra note 98, at 1181-82.
When this theory is applied to the interest on lawyers' trust account programs, the pro-
grams do not seem offensive to the Taking Clause. The actual amount of the interest that
is taken from the individual client should be small. Even though the client loses the right
to receive income from his property, the amount of that loss will not be substantial in
comparison with the value of the funds themselves.
However, the programs are more similar to cases where the courts have refused to apply
the diminution of value theory. For example, in Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939
(Ct. Cl. 1977), the court of claims held that the diminution of value theory did not apply
where the government had deprived the Willard Hotel owners of any use of the hotel to
produce income. The programs also deny the client the right to use his funds for earning
any income for himself or anyone else, other than the government. Therefore, this theory
should not apply to the programs.
113. In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated
the strand-bundle theory: "[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety." Id. at 65-66. See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Pete v. United States, 531 F.2d 1018 (Ct.
Cl. 1976); Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Aris Gloves, Inc. v.
United States, 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970); R.J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d
988 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Rippley v.
City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983). The policy that supports this theory is that
the government can take some uses of property as long as it leaves the owner some other
uses that are of economic value. In other words, an individual's interest in only certain
limited uses of his property is not sufficient to overcome the government's interest in pro-
hibiting those same limited uses.
In the Andrus case, the Secretary of the Interior had issued a regulation prohibiting com-
merce in bird parts. The plaintiffs, who were owners of bird parts, sued on the ground
that the regulation took one of their property rights in the bird parts, namely the "oppor-
tunity to earn a profit" from the sale of the parts. The Supreme Court held that the regula-
tions did not violate the Taking Clause. The Court pointed out that the plaintiffs were
deprived of only one of their property rights inherent in their ownership of the bird parts.
The plaintiffs were still free to "possess and transport their property, and to donate or
devise the protected birds." 444 U.S. at 66. The fact that the plaintiffs were denied the
most profitable use of their property-the right to sell it-was insufficient cause to find
that a taking had occurred. Id. at 66-68.
On one hand, it appears that the application of the strand-bundle theory to the programs
would mean that the programs do not violate the Taking Clause. If the client owns a bun-
dle of rights in the funds, including the right to possess, the right to transport, the right
to donate, and the right to devise, then the destruction of one of those rights-the right
to the income from the investment of the property-would not result in a compensable taking.
On the other hand, the programs are distinguishable from cases such as Andrus. In Andrus,
the regulation forbade certain uses of the property. Here, the program prescribes the use
of the funds and allows only that one use of the income. The prohibition of some uses
may be distinguishable from the prescription of only one use, especially where that use
is to benefit the government. A prohibition is more in the nature of an exercise of the
police power than a command that income be earned and be paid to the government. A
command to earn and pay income is surely a taking under the invasion theory.
114. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), provides six
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different results. But, where the application of the invasion theory results
in a finding that there has been a taking, courts will not apply other
theories. One writer states:
The modern significance of physical occupation is that courts,
while they sometimes do hold non-trespassory injuries compen-
sable, never deny compensation for a physical takeover. The one
incontestable case for compensation . . .seems to occur when
government . . . [or] its agents . . . "regularly" use, or "per-
manently" occupy, . . . a thing which theretofore was understood
to be under private ownership. This may be true although the
invasion is practically trifling from the owner's point of view
'Is
Consequently, in deciding whether the programs accomplish a taking
of the client's income, a court should first determine whether the inva-
sion theory applies. Since there is a taking under the invasion theory,
the other theories will not apply. To hold otherwise would be to produce
just the sort of "danger" that Justice Holmes spoke of in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon: 6 "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of pay-
ing for the change.""' 7
Since the programs accomplish a governmental taking of constitutional-
ly protected property without compensation, the programs meet both
criteria for violation of the Taking Clause. Compensating the client would
factors to balance against one another to determine whether there has been a taking. Those
factors include a consideration of both the government's interest and the individual's loss.
After weighing all of the factors in Penn Central, reasonable men might differ, but they
could support an argument that there is a taking under that test.
115. Michelman, supra note 98, at 1184-85. See also Noranda Exploration v. Ostrom,
113 Wis. 2d 612, 335 N.W.2d 596 (1983). The Loretto case bears out this viewpoint. Under
the diminution of value theory, the loss of a few square feet in a building would not have
diminished the building's value substantially, so there would have been no taking. Likewise,
under the strand-bundle theory, the loss of a small strand such as the right to deny the
use of a few square feet would not have severely affected the owner's bundle of rights in
the building. But the Court first applied the invasion theory, and, finding that there was
a taking under the invasion theory, did not apply any of the other theories. It expressly
ruled out the application of the strandbundle theory or Penn Central factors. The Supreme
Court stated in Loretto that where there was a permanent occupation of the property, the
strand-bundle theory was not to be applied. The reason, it said, was that where there was
a permanent occupation, "the government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the
'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand."
458 U.S. at 435. "So long as these regulations do not require the [property owner] to suffer
the physical occupation of a portion of his [property] by a third party, they will be analyzed
under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.
See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)." 458 U.S.
at 440.
116. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
117. Id. at 416.
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defeat the purpose of the program; thus the Taking Clause precludes the
constitutional enactment of such a program.
Violation of Procedural Due Process
Two characteristics of the interest on lawyers' trust accounts programs
raise the question of whether the programs also violate the procedural
due process commands of the fourteenth amendment. ' 8 Those
characteristics are that the government apparently deprives persons of
private property" 9 and that the government does not give notice or a hear-
ing at any time before or after the deprivation.20 The first of these
characteristics has been addressed by two courts' 2 ' in considering the con-
stitutionality of these programs. The second characteristic has caused great
concern among law review writers and courts alike. 2 '
118. The fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause states: "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." Procedural
due process is to be distinguished from substantive due process. Procedural due process
is "the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to
deprive a person of his possessions." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). That duty
of the government requires it to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to the per-
son being deprived. Id. Substantive due process, by contrast, "demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934), quoted in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
85 (1980). For a discussion of the source of the fourteenth amendment, see E. CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 325-27 (1973). See generally, L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501-63, 886-990 (1978).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 123-75.
120. Originally, the Florida program required an attorney participating in the program
to obtain the consent of his client before investing the client's funds for the benefit of
the Florida Bar Foundation. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 807 (Fla.
1978). But the consent requirement was later removed, and the program was changed to
deprive the client of any control over the income earned on the account. In re Interest
on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 1981). The change was precipitated by the
insistence of the Internal Revenue Service that it would tax the interest earned on the ac-
count to the client under the assignment of income doctrine. Id. Such a tax treatment would
require accounting work that might cost more than the income. Lavine, State Bars Seek
to Put Clients' Money to Work, I NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 1979, at 10. Plans adopted in
other states generally followed the Florida pattern of not requiring notice to the client.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1984) (absence of any reference
to client's consent or notice to client); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (Supp. 1983) (absence
of any reference to client's consent or notice to client); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n,
332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982) (lawyers do not have to notify clients because clients
do not have a "property interest"); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 974,
453 A.2d 1258, 1260 (1982) (lawyers do not have to notify clients).
121. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re Minnesota
State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982). The Florida court resolved that issue by
deciding that there was no "property" that was protected by the fourteenth amendment.
The Minnesota court agreed with Florida's opinion.
122. See cases cited supra note 120; see also Comment, A Source of Revenue, Part
II, supra note 60, at 129; Comment, A Source of Revenue, Part I, supra note 60, at 556-59.
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Definition of Property
The Due Process Clause does not protect against a deprivation of
every kind of interest that a person may hold; 23 only those interests that
constitute "property" are protected.'24 As previously discussed,"' Loui-
siana does give the client the right to the income earned on a trust account.
Hagerty clearly provides a remedy for clients whose income is taken
without their consent.'" Hagerty and the Louisiana property laws create
a reasonable expectation in clients that any income earned on their trust
funds will be paid to the clients. Therefore, the interest income is prop-
erty under state law for purposes of the Due Process Clause.
Claim of Entitlement
Once an interest is classified as property under state law, it is necessary
to determine whether the property interest raises a "claim of
entitlement."' 27 The United States Supreme Court's approach is a bit
unclear on how to determine whether the property interest raises a claim
of entitlement. After the pronouncement of the claim of entitlement test
in Board of Regents v. Roth'2' and until Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division v. Craft,'29 the Court seemed to equate a finding that state law
defined an interest as property with a finding of a claim of entitlement.
That is, once the Court determined that state law gave rise to a property
interest, it routinely found that the property interest was a claim of
entitlement. 3  But in Craft and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., I the
Supreme Court inserted an additional test into the formula for determin-
ing what is a claim of entitlement. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority in Logan, stated: "The hallmark of property, the Court has em-
phasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which can-
not be removed except 'for cause.' ",32 Therefore, it is not enough to
say that the income from the trust accounts is "property" under Loui-
123. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
124. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. "593, 603 (1972); Lapham v. California Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
705 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1983); Durham v. Jones, 698 F.2d 1179, 1181 (11th Cir. 1983).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 64-76.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73 & note 73.
127. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982); Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I, 9 (1978); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976);
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1016
(8th Cir. 1983).
128. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
129. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
130. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
131. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
132. Id. at 430.
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siana law. To find a claim of entitlement, it is necessary to show that
the right under state law can be taken only "for cause."
Two restrictions on the power of the attorney to assign the income
to the bar foundation limit the causes for which property may be taken.
The bar foundation can claim the interest only in certain narrow situa-
tions: when the period of time the funds will be held is short or where
the funds are a small amount."'3 Thus, the program in general establishes
two causes for taking the income. Since the program embodies a "cause"
standard and the income is "property" under Louisiana law, such a pro-
gram in Louisiana would give rise to a claim of entitlement by the client.' 3
Therefore, the client has a property interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment, if he can establish that the property right taken is significant.
Significant Deprivation
The United States Supreme Court said 'in Fuentes v. Shevin that
"[Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview
of the Due Process Clause.""' In determining what is a significant depriva-
tion, courts cannot rely solely on factors such as the length of the
133. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
134. A recent case might be analogized to the programs and cited as support for holding
that the income is not a property interest. In Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654
(1982), the Supreme Court held that procedural due process was not violated by a Califor-
nia statute that delegated to distillers the authority to restrict imports to certain wholesalers
only. The wholesalers challenging the stattitory restriction had argued that they had a pro-
tected property interest, but the Court rejected the argument that they had a constitutional-
ly protected liberty or property interest. Certain language in the opinion could be used to
argue that the client has no property interest in the earned income. The Court said:
Thus, the Due Process Clause is not offended by the wholesaler's inability to
challenge the distiller's decisionmaking. What respondents are really challenging
is the California Legislature's decision to give such a power to the distiller without
establishing any criteria to govern the exercise of that power. The Due Process
Clause does not authorize this Court to assess the wisdom of the California
Legislature's decision.
Id. at 664. The language used by the Court here suggests that it lacks the power to review
the adequacy of the statute for due process purposes, if the only ground asserted as a viola-
tion is the absence of standards in a delegation of power to a private entity. If that were
true, then a court could not review the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of
the programs here. What must be clarified, when reading Rice, is that the Court did not
make these remarks in a vacuum, nor were the remarks even necessary to the Court's holding.
The language quoted above followed the Court's resolution of the case which was based
entirely on its finding that the wholesalers lacked a protected property interest. Further-
more, the Court did not really explain why the wholesalers' interest was not protected prop-
erty, nor even why it was not property. The Court merely said that their interest was not
"protected" property. Therefore, Rice is distinguishable on its facts from the programs
discussed here.
135. 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). Accord North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975).
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deprivation'36 and the severity of the deprivation.' 37 A claimant need not
show a "grievous loss"' 38 nor an absolute ownership right in the
property.' 39 The most important factors in determining whether the
deprivation is significant are the nature and the weight of the property
interest.' 40 If the nature and the weight of the property interest are not
"de minimis, '14 then the deprivation is significant.
In assessing the nature of the client's property interest in the income
earned on his funds, an important fact is that the client has full title
to the funds. The law has historically given greater protection to owner-
ship rights than it has given to mere possessory interests.' 4 2 Thus, the
client's ownership of the funds is a strong reason to find that a taking
of interest earned on those funds is a significant deprivation.
Additionally, the right to income from the funds invested in interest-
bearing accounts during legal disputes concerning title to the funds is
generally awarded to the owners of the funds.' 3 This "usual and general
136. North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975).
137. Id.
138. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975). Contra Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ.,
679 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1982). In Rose, the first circuit refused to find that students in public
schools had a protected property interest in not having school bus service interrupted for
up to five days. Part of the basis for its opinion was that the students suffered no grievous
loss. Id. at 281.
139. North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972).
140. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972).
141. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently found
that a student's right to school bus transportation was not deprived where the student lost
that service for a few days. The court said that the loss was de minimis, and that the
property interest probably was not "sufficiently weighty for the Due Process Clause to apply."
Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279, 281 (1st Cir. 1982). The court said that the
right was not very important, and that no great principle was at stake, as there had been
in cases on voting rights, the environment, and public assistance. Id. at 281-82.
142. The comparisons between full ownership and property interests that constitute less
than full ownership in the caselaw on procedural due process make this conclusion abun-
dantly clear. For example, in Fuentes the Supreme Court states that "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protection of 'property' . . . has never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights
of undisputed ownership. Rather, it has been read broadly to extend protection to 'any
significant property interest.' .... " 407 U.S. at 86 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). Implied in that statement is a recognition that full ownership has
been given greater weight in property law in general. The import of this recognition is that,
in general, property law's greater deference to ownership gives rise to a reasonable expecta-
tion that such ownership rights will be protected. "In deciding whether an interest in a
government benefit rises to the level of protected property, the Supreme Court has us look
to the reasonable expectations of those who receive the benefit." Rose v. Nashua Bd. of
Educ., 679 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1982). Clients who advance funds to a lawyer would
* reasonably expect that any income earned from those funds would belong to the client.
143. "The usual and general rule is that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited
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rule""' is further evidence of the great protection given to owners of
invested funds. If the right to the income were not significant, such a
"usual and general rule" would not exist.
In assessing the weight of the property interest, an additional factor
is relevant: the frequency with which the property interest might be in-
terfered. Since the inauguration of the interest on lawyers' trust accounts
programs, other occupational groups have grown interested in adopting
similar programs. For example, realtors have already begun to express
a desire for laws to permit them to deposit their clients' funds into trust
accounts for the benefit of housing programs."" If realtors, certified public
accountants, stock brokers, trading factors, and a host of other business
persons were to have similar programs adopted, the frequency of the taking
of income from clients' funds would increase dramatically." 6 The poten-
tial for this program's expansion into other occupations and businesses
makes it imperative that a court assess the impact of the lawyers' pro-
grams' deprivation in light of its possible effect on other occupations and
businesses and their clients." 7
In order for the deprivation to be significant, the property right itself
must be significant; the loss in dollars and cents to an individual should
not be dispositive. Although the Supreme Court has never stated express-
ly that economic value is assigned little weight in determining what is
"significant," the Court's decisions clearly show that it gives economic
value little weight. For example, little economic value is at stake in a
ten-day suspension from public school, yet the Court found that the four-
teenth amendment protected the right to attend public school.'"" In the
Fuentes cases, the Court found that the Due Process Clause protected
the rights to possess: a stove and a stereo; a child's clothes, furniture,
fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the
owners of that principal." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980).
144. Id.
145. See General Counsel Memorandum No. 38,374 (May 12, 1980) (LEXIS, Fedtax
library, Gen. Counsel Memo. file).
146. Suppose, for example, that insurance companies found that computing a few days
interest on funds it held for the benefit of its customers actually cost the companies more
than the amount of interest that they paid the customers, so that customers were actually
losing money by having this interest paid to them. Further suppose that all the insurance
companies decided to have that interest paid over to a foundation to benefit victims of
accidents who had no insurance. The impact would be staggering. Surely, a court would
find that the interest of the companies' individual customers was significant.
147. Banks and other financial institutions already use sophisticated means of taking
advantage of the "float" on transfers of money between each other. If lawyers and other
professions and occupations adopt programs to benefit projects, many more groups will
be using the "float." These additional groups using the "float" are not subject to examina-
tion or regulation by the federal government, as are the banks. Furthermore, the use of
computers to manipulate the float can hide criminal transactions fairly easily.
148. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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and toys; and a bed, table, and other household goods." 9 If one were
to compute the economic value lost by each of the claimants above on
the basis of the fair rental value of the items for a period of five days,
it is unlikely that the total loss in any case would exceed fifty dollars.
Yet, Maryland's program considers fifty dollars de minimis.'I" If the Con-
stitution protects fifty dollar possessory losses under Fuentes, the fifty
dollar loss in ownership of income to the client under the Maryland pro-
gram should also be protected. The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach
in Price v. City of Junction,' 5 ' where the court held that a junk car was
protected property, whether its value was little or great. Consequently,
the programs accomplish a significant deprivation whether the amount
of income taken from the client is large or small.
State Action
In order to show that the programs violate procedural due process,
the state, rather than a private party, must cause the deprivation.' That
the lawyer acts pursuant to a statute passed by the legislature' or a rule
issued by the judiciary' is not enough to establish state action. In Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co.,'" the Supreme Court stated that, in order to at-
tribute an act to the state, two tests must be met:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.
• . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be
because he is a state official, because he has acted together with
or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because
his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State."6
Both voluntary and compulsory programs meet the first test since, in all
cases, either the legislature or the state supreme court creates the pro-
grams. In states with voluntary programs, the state creates a right for
the lawyer to act.' 57 In states with compulsory programs, the state im-
149. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
150. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
151. 711 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
152. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
153. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978); see Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
154. The Due Process Clause applies to the judiciary of a state government, as well
as to the executive and legislative branches. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
165 (1978).
155. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
156. Id. at 937 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
157. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (Supp. 1983); In re Interest on Trust
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poses an obligation on the lawyer to act.'
In discussing the second part of the state action requirement-that
the depriving party be a state actor-the Lugar Court recognized several
tests employed in earlier cases.'"9 One of them, the state compulsion test,'
60
is especially germane to the compulsory programs. Essentially, under this
test state-compelled action is state action.' 6 In states with mandatory pro-
grams, the lawyer must deposit funds that meet the criteria into accounts
that will pay the income to the bar or its designated recipient."'6 The state
does not permit the lawyer to refuse to comply with the rule; the lawyer
is subject to disciplinary action by the state supreme court if he disobeys. 
63
Consequently, the state compels the lawyer to assign the income from
the clients' funds and to deprive his clients of property protected by the
fourteenth amendment. This compulsion constitutes state action.
Since compulsory programs contain all of the elements necessary to
find a deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, clients
whose interests are assigned to the bar foundations in compulsory pro-
grams are entitled to notice and a hearing.'64
With respect to the voluntary programs, it is not immediately clear
whether the lawyers' act of assigning the income constitutes state action.
There are several ways to analyze this issue. One approach is the "nexus"
test of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,'65 in which the Supreme
Court found state action in a state agency's lease of part of a building
to a restaurant that discriminated against blacks. The lease had created
a mix of rights, obligations, and benefits in favor of both the restaurant
and the state which made the restaurant and the state interdependent.
That interdependence between private enterprise and the state was a form
of joint participation in the discrimination and constituted state action.'
66
Were the Louisiana Supreme Court to adopt a program for interest
Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 393-94 (Fla. 1981); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H.
971, 974, 453 A.2d 1258, 1260 (1982).
158. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211(a) (West Supp. 1984); In re Minnesota
State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Mnn. 1982).
159. 457 U.S. at 939.
160. Id.; see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
161. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
162. See supra note 57.
163. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1979).
164. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
165. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
166. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982); Little v. Streator, 452
U.S. 1, 9-11 (1981); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974); Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961); Buller v. Buechler, 706
F.2d 844, 849 (1983); see also Dumez v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 334 So.
2d 494 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 337 So. 2d 275 (1976).
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on trust accounts, a similar mix of rights, obligations, and benefits would
exist in the relationship between practicing lawyers and the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The supreme court has "the inherent power . . . to
regulate and control membership in the bar of the state"' 67 and "to
prescribe rules and regulations to govern the right to practice law in this
state.' ' 1 8 The lawyer has a right to practice law only if the supreme court
grants him that right. 69 The supreme court has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer practicing in
Louisiana.' 0 In exchange for the lawyer's court-granted right to practice
law and his obedience to the supreme court's disciplinary rules, the court
protects him from competition by those whom the court has not admit-
ted to practice.
These strong ties exist not only between the supreme court and the
lawyer, but also among the supreme court, the lawyers, and the state bar
association. The bar association owes its very existence to the state supreme
court.II
Additionally, the programs direct that client funds be spent on pro-
jects that will indirectly achieve state goals: provision of legal services,
access to courts, and the improvement of the justice system. The lawyers
are merely conduits or agents through which the state acts to achieve its
goals and obligations. These ties between the state, the lawyers, and the
goals of such programs lead to the conclusion that in states with volun-
tary programs as well as in states with compulsory programs, the act of
the lawyer in assigning the income to the bar association would be state
action.'72
Like that in Lugar, the Supreme Court's rationale in Jackson v.
167. In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 47, 11 So. 2d 398, 400 (1942); see LA. CONST. art. V,
§ 5(A). In holding that the state bar association could enforce the rule that members of
the bar pay dues by revoking the license of a nonpaying member, the Louisiana Supreme
Court said:
The members of the bar, unlike the members of other professions, are under
the direct control of the courts in the practice of their profession; hence it should
not require much formality to constitute due process of law in the matter of com-
pelling an attorney at law to obey the rules of court.
202 La. at 57-58, 11 So. 2d at 403.
168. In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 49, 11 So. 2d 398, 400 (1942).
169. See LA. R.S. 37:213 (1974).
170. LA. CoNST. art. V, § 5(B).
171. See LA. R.S. 37:211 (1974).
172. The conclusion should apply to states that have adopted voluntary programs whether
legislatively or by rule of the state supreme court. When the supreme court both regulates
the practice of law and issues a rule with the force of law adopting the programs as part
of the regulation of the practice of law, it clearly is giving aid to the lawyer's act. For
example, where the state regulates public education and also supplies books to private schools
that discriminate, the combination of regulation and aid constitutes state action. Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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Metropolitan Edison Co.' 3 supports the conclusion that state action is
present in the programs. In Jackson, the Court held that the acts of a
business that was subject to regulation were not necessarily state acts.
The Court distinguished the case from those cases in which regulated
businesses' acts might indeed be considered acts of the state: "It may
well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something
of a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to
be 'state' acts than will the acts of an entity lacking these characteris-
tics.'" 7
The supreme court heavily regulates the legal profession in Louisiana,
and lawyers do have something of a governmentally protected monopoly.
The characteristics suggest that a lawyer's assignment of income from his
clients' accounts for the benefit of the bar association is state action.
Since the programs meet all the requirements for fourteenth amend-
ment protection, the clients are entitled to procedural due process-notice
and hearing.'
Notice and Hearing
Generally speaking, the programs adopted as of August 1983 do not
require that notice or hearing be afforded the client at any time.'"6 Courts
testing the programs' constitutionality have not addressed the hearing
issue, ' but some have addressed the notice issue. Those courts address-
173. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
174. Id. at 350-51.
175. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
176. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1984); Md. Ann.
Code art. 10, § 44 (Supp. 1983); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla.
1981); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hamp-
shire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982). The Florida program, as originally
adopted, did require that the lawyer give notice to his clients, and further required that
the lawyer desist from using a clients' funds to generate income for the bar association
if the client gave the lawyer written objections to having his funds used in that way. In
re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 805 (Fla. 1978). The assumption was that
a client who had been given notice and did not object in writing wished to have his income
paid over to the bar foundation. That assumption has been questioned. Comment, A Source
of Revenue, Part II, supra note 60, at 129-31. The writer of that comment pointed out
that the assumption was being used to argue that a client who did not object in writing
had "waived" his rights in the income that would be earned on his funds. The writer went
on to state that such a "waiver" was probably not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, and
so was not a valid waiver of any constitutional rights to the income. The waiver issue became
moot when the Florida Supreme Court later determined that a client had no constitutional
rights to the income. This history of the notice issue in Florida is significant because neither
notice to the client nor an assumed waiver would have been necessary in the original pro-
gram unless the court had felt that there were property rights of the client involved.
177. Other states followed the Florida analysis. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3,
at 8; see In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re Minnesota
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ing the issue have found that notice was not required because the prop-
erty interest asserted did not exist.' 8 But, as discussed earlier, this prop-
erty interest does exist and is protected by the fourteenth amendment.' 9
Therefore, at some point, the lawyer is constitutionally required to in-
form his clients that he intends to deposit or has deposited their funds
into accounts, the income from which will be paid to the bar foundation.
Since the programs do not now require such notice, the programs are
constitutionally defective, at least with regard to those clients who do not
receive notice.180
The client must also be afforded "some kind of hearing."'' Whether
that hearing must be a full-blown evidentiary court proceeding with the
right to counsel and the right to cross-examination, whether it can be
as informal as an opportunity to make an oral argument before a hearing
examiner, or whether some intermediate range of protective procedures
is required, depends on the three point analysis adopted by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.' 2 The first step is to examine the "private
interest that will be affected by the official action."' 83 The private in-
terest affected by the programs is the right to receive income on invested
funds. The amount of the income at stake in any individual case should
be small, and the severity of the individual loss will be mild. In cases
where the funds are held for a short time, the duration of the deprivation
of the right to receive interest should be short. A reasonable conclusion
is that the effect on the private individual's interest will not be great.
Yet, at the same time, the potential exists for a much greater effect on
all individuals in the aggregrate. A principle of some magnitude is at issue:
The individuals affected will suffer a loss to further the state's interest
in funding public programs without the protection of the state legislature's
appropriation and taxation committee process. Instead, the loss will be
at the hands of a legislative committee or court that may have no
experience or even desire to adhere to sound taxation policies.""
State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hamphsire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H.
971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982).
178. See cases cited supra note 177.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 64-76.
180. The program may not be unconstitutional on its face, because the statutes or rules
adopted do not prohibit the lawyer from giving notice to his client. In fact, the Florida
Supreme Court approved of lawyers giving notice to their clients, on the basis that it would
assist the lawyer-client relationship. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 396
(Fla. 1981). Some lawyers would inform their clients. Therefore, the analysis above pertains
only to clients who did not get notice.
181. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976); see Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. Rev. 17 (1981);
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
182. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
183. Id. at 335.
184. The question of whether court-adopted programs constitute taxation without represen-
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The second Mathews factor is the "risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.'" The procedures
used to accomplish the deprivation in these programs vary, 8 6 but several
of the programs give the lawyer the discretion to determine what is a
"short period" and what is a "small sum."' 87 In the absence of a stan-
dard for determining what is a short period, some lawyers may conclude
that a short period is five days, while others may conclude that a short
period is thirty days. Similarly, lawyers are likely to have diverse inter-
pretations of what a small sum of money is. Clearly the absence of stan-
dards can result in deprivation of one client when another client in a similar
situation would not be deprived.' 88 The lack of standards makes it im-
possible to ascertain what an erroneous deprivation is. Since it also is
impossible for a lawyer to be able to tell in advance whether he is making
an erroneous deprivation, he might unwittingly open himself to liability
for conversion.'9 The addition of some guidelines for the attorney's deci-
sion as to what constitutes a short period or a small sum would clearly
be of tremendous value in preventing erroneous deprivations. Besides the
addition of standards, a requirement that the lawyer notify the client that
he intends to invest the funds for the benefit of the bar association would
certainly reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation, because the client other-
wise may not even know that a deprivation has occurred. These considera-
tions suggest that under the first and second Mathews factors, it is essen-
tial that the client be afforded the protection of at least some well-defined
standard, if not a full blown hearing at which he can challenge the basis
for the attorney's judgment that the period was short or the sum was
small.
tation has been raised by at least one writer. Note, supra note 60, at 427. Treatment of
that issue is beyond the scope of this article, but it should be noted that under the Loui-
siana Constitution only the legislative branch of state government has the power to tax.
See LA. CONST. art. III, § 16(B).
185. 424 U.S. at 335.
186. Maryland has provided in its statute that the client's funds may be deposited for
the benefit of the Legal Services Corporation if the amount of income from those single
client's funds will be less than $50. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
187. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1984); In re Interest
on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); In re Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d
151 (Minn. 1982); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982).
It should be noted that California provided in its statute for the issuance of regulations
by the Board of Governors of the State Bar Association. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
6225 (West Supp. 1984). Those regulations, if any exist, may provide standards.
188. Obviously, the programs raise some substantive due process issues. However, treat-
ment of those issues is beyond the scope of this article.
189. However, he would apparently not be open to any disciplinary action for having
made a wrong decision. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 394 n.14 (Fla.
1981). But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6211(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1984) (gives powers
to the state supreme court and the state bar association to make and enforce rules regarding
the programs).
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The third of the Mathews factors is a consideration of "the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail." 90 The function of the programs is to raise revenue
to fund legal services for the indigent and other law-related projects for
the benefit of society. The state has a great interest in supporting such
programs because they increase access to the judicial system, educate the
public, and improve the judicial system. If the suggested additional pro-
cedures were adopted, the state itself would incur no fiscal or ad-
ministrative burdens to give notice because the addition of standards re-
quires no money and the lawyer could easily shoulder the responsibility
for notifying the client. However, if formal hearings were required when
a dispute arose, the state might have to shoulder a tremendous load. It
would be unfair to permit the bar association to resolve these disputes
because it has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the dispute.
And, because it is a private corporation 9 and not a state agency, it is
questionable whether the bar association ought to be settling these disputes
between the state and its citizens in the first place. Likewise, the lawyer
is a private citizen who should not be authorized to settle disputes be-
tween the state and its citizens when it is the lawyer's act on behalf of
the state that is the focus of the dispute. The only existing entity left
to assume the responsibility of providing the hearing would be the courts,
which are already suffering under monstrous workloads. One alternative
is to create a committee or agency to act as a hearing examiner to resolve
disputes between the state and the client. But such a committee or agency
might cost as much in taxes as the revenues that are earned on the client
accounts contribute to legal services. In that case, it would be more sensi-
ble simply to fund legal services out of taxes and eliminate altogether
both the program and the need for the committee.
Another alternative would be to protect the client's due process rights
by coupling together two protective measures. First, the state could add
well-defined standards to the program to determine exactly what is a short
period and what is a small sum. Second, the state could allow the client
to sue the attorney and the bar association for conversion, and allow
damages equal to the erroneous deprivation plus costs and attorney fees.
Practically, few clients would sue on frivolous claims because the award
of damages would be so small. Most suits could be heard in city courts
where dockets are not as crowded as in district courts. Moreover, the
threat of suit and its unfavorable publicity to the individual lawyer would
have a deterrent effect on violations of the client's due process rights.
A final alternative, especially in light of the prior determination that
190. 424 U.S. at 335.
191. See LA. R.S. 37:211 (1974).
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the program violates the Taking Clause, 92 would be to decide that the
program is not worth the cost of providing a client due process. However,
even if the state finds an acceptable means of granting due process to
the client, there remains the question of whether a lawyer's participation
in the program is ethical.
Lawyers' Trust Accounts and Legal Ethics
Persons considering the ethics of adopting and implementing a pro-
gram must address five problems. The first question is whether the pro-
gram fulfills the lawyer's duty to make legal counsel available.' 93 The pro-
gram does not fulfill the lawyer's duty, because the state, rather than
the lawyer, is making legal counsel available. Practically, participating
lawyers only act as agents of the state to collect funds to fulfill the state's
goal of providing access to the judicial process.' 9
The second problem is that the programs violate Louisiana's Code
of Professional Responsibility disciplinary rules against mishandling client
funds. Mishandling of client funds is already the most common disciplinary
infraction by lawyers in Louisiana."' The programs offer the potential
for even more violations of what has long been the lawyers' strict fiduciary
duty to protect client funds. 9 6
Disciplinary rule 9-102 requires that a lawyer deliver a client's prop-
erty to the client.' 97 Since the income earned on the client's funds is
the client's property, the lawyer is under a duty to return the income
to the client.' 9 The opinion of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility supports this conclusion.' 9  The Committee found
that lawyers' participation in a program would not violate the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility if state law did not consider the income
to be the client's property."' The implication is that the programs are
unethical if under state law the income is the client's property, as it is
in Louisiana.
In addition, there is a great danger that some lawyers, whether inten-
tionally or through sheer carelessness, would use the income from the
192. See supra text accompanying notes 77-117.
193. "A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal
counsel available." CODE OF PROF. RESP. Canon 2 (1974), supra note 9.
194. See LA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-4, 12, 22.
195. Hebert, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Professional Responsibility, 36 LA. L. REv. 515, 516 (1976).
196. CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 9-102 (1974), supra note 9; see supra text accompanying
notes 16-21.
197. CODE OF PROF. Rasp. DR 9-102(B)(4) (1974), supra note 9.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
199. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 8.
200. Id.
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trust account for their own personal benefits.2"' Suppose, for example,
that a trust account contains the funds of one client. The attorney,
withdrawing money from the account to cover his fee for work he has
performed, discovers that the balance of the account is less than his fee.
The attorney then withdraws all of the funds in the account, including
the interest which under the program was to be paid to the bar associa-
tion. The withdrawal of the income which under the program belongs
to the bar association is a conversion of the funds. A conversion of non-
client funds has been held sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.20 2
Where the conversion of the bar foundation's income is intentional, the
situation becomes even more serious.
The third problem arises in connection with a statement in the ABA
Committee opinion. The Committee found that the programs were ethical
on the assumption that "either a court or a legislature has authorized
a program with [certain] attributes . . ., and thus, either implicitly or
explicitly, has made a determination that the interest earned is not the
clients' property." 2 3 If the Louisiana legislature, by adopting such a pro-
gram, "implicitly or explicitly" decided that the income was not the client's
property, the Louisiana Supreme Court could strike down the law on two
grounds.
The first ground could be the supreme court's disagreement with the
legislature's determination that the income is not a client's property. The
court could find that the program is a taking of private property without
just compensation.0 If the legislation is unconstitutional, then participa-
tion would cease to be ethical.
The second ground for striking down the legislation would be a find-
ing that the legislation violated the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine.0 The rationale would be that the legislation is a regulation of
the practice of law because it purports to control how lawyers deal with
clients and client funds. The regulation of the practice of law is an in-
herent and a constitutional power of the judicial branch of state
government.20 6 The Louisiana Supreme Court has exclusive and original
201. In Louisiana cases, intent is not a necessary element of a violation of disciplinary
rule 9-102. It is only an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate penalty. Careless
accounting habits will warrant discipline, because they give the appearance of impropriety.
See LSBA v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976); accord In re Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491, 652
P.2d 1014 (1982); see also LSBA v. Mitchell, 375 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1979) (technical viola-
tion); LSBA v. Stinson, 368 So. 2d 971 (La.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979) (com-
mingling and using $1300 in client funds in personal account for three days, even uninten-
tionally, may warrant discipline of a serious nature).
202. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Ricketts, 599 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1980).
203. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 3, at 8.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 77-117.
205. See LA. CoNsT. art. II, § 2; Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Con-
stitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. REV. 765 (1977).
206. See Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. LSBA, 378 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. 1979).
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jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, 20
and the court, in the exercise of these powers, "will uphold legislative
acts passed in aid of its inherent power, but will strike down statutes
which tend to impede or frustrate its authority."" '' Thus, if the legisla-
tion approved of methods of dealing with client funds similar to those
of other programs, and if the Louisiana Supreme Court found that those
methods impeded its ability to enforce the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, the court could strike down the legislation. Clearly, the legisla-
tion would authorize a lawyer to violate the rules against commingling
and conversion of client funds." 9 Such authorization would impede the
supreme court's powers to discipline the legal profession in Louisiana.
Thus, the supreme court could strike down the legislation ' on these
grounds, as well as on federal constitutional grounds. In Louisiana at
least, lawyers should be reluctant to rely on a legislative implication that
participation in a program would be ethical.
A fourth problem is the potential increase in conflicts of interest viola-
tions. The program creates the possibility of a conflict between the client's
interest and the bar foundation's interest, to both of which the lawyer
owes a duty.
The fifth and most compelling ethical objection to the programs is
that they promote the appearance of impropriety while Canon 9 requires
that a lawyer avoid the appearance of impropriety. The programs are very
likely to affect adversely the public's confidence in the legal profession.
A recent survey showed that seventy percent of those surveyed considered
lawyers' honesty and ethics to be no better than average. Twenty-seven
percent rated lawyers' ethics low or even very low."' With the public
evidencing so little confidence in the legal profession, laymen are very
likely to mistrust the statements of lawyers that the programs benefit the
needy. The public is likely to suspect that lawyers want the programs
because the programs will benefit some lawyers financially.
Indeed, some lawyers are likely to gain financially from the programs
207. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(B); Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. LSBA, 378
So. 2d 423 (La. 1979); Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978);
Hargrave, supra note 205, at 799; see LA. SuP. CT. R. 19; see also Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265 (1882); Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856) (both concerned with the
inherent power of courts over the professional conduct of lawyers).
208. Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. LSBA, 378 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. 1979)
(emphasis added). See also Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prod., Inc., 373 So. 2d 102, 115 (La. 1978).
209. See CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 9-102 (1974), supra note 9.
210. If the program were adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, instead of the
legislature, the legislature might argue that the judiciary had violated the Louisiana Con-
stitution by usurping the legislative power to tax. See LA. CONST. art. Ill, § 16(B). Thus,
serious separation of powers issues could arise if the judiciary and the legislature disagree
on whether Louisiana should adopt a program. See supra note 54.
211. Lawyers' Public Image Is Dreadful, Spurring Concern by Attorneys, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
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because they will receive payments for services rendered to the indigent
that they would not otherwise receive. Furthermore, lawyers may stand
to gain financially from the programs if funds earmarked "for the im-
provement of the administration of justice"2 ' indirectly find their way
into lawyers' pockets. The "improvement of the administration of justice,"
for example, might encompass reduced fees for lawyers' continuing legal
education, reduced contributions by lawyers for client security funds, grants
to draft new legislation favoring lawyers economically, expense accounts
for bar officials' travel, and a host of other disbursements that presently
are paid from private contributions rather than public funds.
In addition to the justified criticism by laymen that some lawyers will
gain financially from the programs, actual impropriety, not merely its
appearance,"' exists when a lawyer lends assistance to a state's violation
of the federal and state constitutions. The programs take private prop-
erty without just compensation"'" and violate procedural due process. " '
Furthermore, the appearance of impropriety exists when a lawyer fails
to inform his client that the client's funds are to be used to generate in-
come that the client will not receive. The position taken by program ad-
vocates that notice is not required " 6 seems to be a gross violation of the
trust relationship that should exist between an attorney and his client."'
The ethical problems with these programs have led a number of
lawyers to reject such programs."' A Maine School of Law professor flatly
states that the program is an "unauthorized use by individual attorneys
and the bar of other people's money." 2 ' Furthermore, seven states have
rejected the programs: Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. 2
Thus, some lawyers, state supreme courts, and legislatures have agreed
212. The "improvement of the administration of justice" is a state objective for the
use of income on lawyers' trust accounts in several programs. See, e.g., In re Interest on
Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
213. See CODE OF PROF. RESP. Canon 9 (1974), supra note 9; MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9, reprinted in I NAT'L REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 55 (1982). The new Model Rules, reprinted in 69 A.B.A. J. 1671
(1983), contain no corresponding provision.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 77-117.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 118-92.
216. See supra notes 120, 122.
217. The law leaves no uncertainty in defining the character of duty which an
attorney owes to his client. The relation of attorney and client is more than a
contract. It superinduces a trust status of the highest order and devolves upon
the attorney the imperative duty of dealing with the client only on the basis of
the strictest fidelity and honor.
Searcy v. Novo, 188 So. 490, 498 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939), writ denied.
218. Rivlin, supra note 1, at 1040.




that the programs should be rejected. This fact, coupled with lay criticism
of lawyers' ethics, should cause the Louisiana lawyer grave concern over
any attempt toward adoption of such a program in Louisiana.
Conclusion
The income earned on a lawyer's trust account containing client funds
is property of the client. Therefore, the interest on lawyers' trust accounts
programs should be rejected in Louisiana for three reasons: (1) The pro-
grams constitute an unconstitutional taking of a client's property without
just compensation; (2) they violate procedural due process; (3) they are
unethical because they violate disciplinary rule 9-102. In short, this pro-
gram is not the means Louisiana should choose to provide funding for
legal services to the indigent. As other lawyers have said: The "use of
clients' money for any purpose, no matter how noble the cause, is
wrong.''2" 1
Amanda French Palmer
221. Id. at 1040.
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